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This paper examines the use of price controls on pharmaceuticals, while controlling for both market 
structure and of firm (and product) characteristics, in estimating the extent and timing of the launch of new 
drugs around the world.  Price controls are found to have a statistically and quantitatively important effect 
on pharmaceutical launches.  These effects take two forms.  First, drugs invented by firms headquartered in 
countries that use price controls reach fewer markets and with longer delays than products that originate in 
countries without price controls.  Second, companies delay launch into price-controlled markets, and are 
less likely to introduce their products in additional markets after entering a country with low prices.  
Launches into low price countries in Europe are further delayed after a regulatory change allowing parallel 
imports, which could potentially depress prices in high price markets.  Overall, the results suggest that a 
country’s use of price controls not only has a substantial impact on entry into that market, but into other 
countries as well, and may affect the strategies of domestic firms. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
This paper examines the use of price controls on pharmaceuticals, while controlling for 
both market structure and firm and product characteristics, in estimating the extent and timing of 
the launch of new drugs around the world.  The influence of regulation on launch decisions has 
been highlighted by many economists (most recently, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Schleifer (2002)).  This work examines how such regulations affect not only the country that uses 
them, but also the domestic industry and entry into other markets. 
Pharmaceutical markets provide an interesting empirical puzzle to explore. Developed 
nations differ from each other in the number of drugs that compete in a market as well as in the 
mix of available products. Over the past 20 years the US has had an average of three drugs 
(unique chemical entities) per therapeutic class, or medical condition for which a drug is 
prescribed. Italy, with a population of about 57 million, has an average of five drugs per 
therapeutic class. Switzerland has an average of four drugs per class for a population of just 7 
million. Only one-third of the prescription pharmaceuticals marketed in one of the seven largest 
drug markets (the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and Canada) are also marketed in 
the other six. This is a strikingly low figure given the size and wealth of these countries and the 
substantial trade between them, and since pharmaceutical firms should have incentive to spread 
the large sunk costs of drug development over as many markets as possible. In addition, some 
markets have no entrants at all, despite the availability of treatments in other countries. 
The entry patterns of pharmaceuticals are important to understand for several reasons. 
The cost of untreated conditions in markets with no entry may be substantial. In addition, there 
are many monopoly and duopoly markets. Competition usually results in lower prices, and given 
the widespread concern about the cost of pharmaceuticals, it is valuable to know what impedes 
further entry into a market. This study also contributes to the debate on the effect of regulations, 
particularly price controls, by examining their impact on the market structure of pharmaceutical 
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markets within a country and on the strategies of firms headquartered in regulated countries.  
These issues are especially salient as several state governments in the US, as well as the federal 
government, have implemented or are considering the use of price controls to contain 
expenditures on pharmaceuticals, and there are proposals to allow imports of price-controlled 
drugs from Canada.  In addition, the European Union has recently expanded and is expected to 
continue to add member states.  This paper provides some predictions on how this expansion 
could affect the prices and availability of drugs in the rest of the trading bloc. 
Price controls are found to have a statistically and quantitatively important effect on 
pharmaceutical launches.  Drugs invented by firms headquartered in countries that use price 
controls reach fewer markets and with longer delays than products that originate in countries 
without price controls.  Possible explanations for this result are discussed below.  In addition, 
companies delay launch into price-controlled markets, and are less likely to introduce their 
products in additional markets after entering a country with price controls.  Overall, the results 
suggest that a country’s use of price controls not only has a substantial impact on entry into that 
market, but into other countries as well. 
The following section gives a brief overview of the pharmaceutical industry and outlines 
regulatory regimes in the countries included in this study.  Section III describes the expected 
impact of price regulation on product launch decisions.  The empirical model is explained in 
Section IV, and Section V describes the data used in this research.  Results are presented in 
Section VI, and Section VII concludes. 
II. Description of Industry and Regulatory Regimes 
Expenditures on health care range from 5% of GDP in South Korea to over 13% in the 
US, and the share of pharmaceutical sales in total health expenditures account for anywhere from 
4% in the US to nearly 18% in France and Italy.  The US is the largest single market at $97 
billion of annual revenue; the five largest European markets amount to $51 billion, as does 
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Japan.1  The industry is highly fragmented: there are thousands of small firms around the world, 
only several hundred of which are research-based and have brought at least one drug to market.  
Table 1 presents a crosstabulation showing the number of drugs by country of origin (location of 
the inventing firm’s headquarters) with the countries in which those drugs are launched.  The US 
is the origin of over a quarter of all drugs, and these products reach an average of about nine 
markets.  Though many drugs are invented in Japan and Italy, they are launched in fewer foreign 
markets.  Drugs with small domestic markets like Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands 
spread to more foreign markets than drugs with large home markets.     
National markets for pharmaceuticals differ on a number of dimensions, of which 
regulation is perhaps the most notable.  The entry of pharmaceuticals is restricted and in many 
countries, so is the price.  Each nation has an agency or ministry devoted to pharmaceutical 
evaluation, which have heterogeneous standards for establishing safety and efficacy and which 
vary in how quickly they evaluate new drug applications.  Some require that some clinical trials 
be performed on domestic patients and are less accepting of foreign data.  Some European 
countries require proof of cost-effectiveness.  During the 1990s, mean approval times ranged 
from 1.3 years in France for 1990, to 4.8 years in Spain for 1991.2  In addition to differences in 
agency funding and bureaucratic efficiency, the number of drugs under review varies 
considerably across years and countries.  There has been a gradual move towards harmonization 
of regulatory standards for all major markets, particularly within the European Union.  Under the 
EU’s Mutual Recognition Procedure, enacted in 1995, a drug approved in one member state (the 
Reference Member State) must be granted marketing authorization in other member states (the 
Concerned Member States) within two months unless a Concerned Member State objects through 
a formal process.  Another option is the Centralized Procedure, in which a drug is submitted to 
the European Medicines Evaluation Agency for marketing approval in all EU nations.  However, 
the drug’s manufacturer must still negotiate with individual countries over price under either the 
Mutual Recognition Procedure or the Centralized Procedure. 
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Price regulation has many variants (see Table 2).  Most countries have adopted some 
form over the last thirty years or so.  As the term is used in this paper, price controls refer a cap 
on either the ex-manufacturer price or the amount a national health service pays for a 
pharmaceutical product (the reimbursement price).  The price for a drug is officially based on 
some determination of therapeutic value, the cost of comparable treatments, the contribution of 
the drug’s manufacturer to the domestic economy, and manufacturing cost; the weight given to 
each factor differs by country.  Importantly, a number of countries reference the price of a drug in 
other countries when setting price.  This “international reference pricing” means that the price in 
one country can affect the price in other markets.  Negotiations between pharmaceutical firms and 
national governments may be lengthy and tense, and drug companies often blame this process for 
delays in product launch.  Pfizer chairman Hank McKinnell has stated “[w]e introduce our new 
products later and later on the French market, and if the government continues to put pressure on 
prices, there will be no more [new products].”3  Broadly speaking, northern European countries 
and the US have fewer or less intrusive price controls, while southern Europe has more extensive 
government intervention.4  The price of a medication tends to be significantly lower in countries 
using price controls than in countries which do not (Danzon and Chao, 2000a).  During the 1990s, 
many countries also enacted price freezes or mandatory price cuts in response to the increasing 
cost of pharmaceuticals.   
Some countries use demand-side controls instead of, or in addition to, direct control of 
price.  Typically, demand-side controls involve either a cap on the total cost of drugs a physician 
can prescribe (encouraging doctors to prescribe less expensive products) or a reference-pricing 
scheme, in which the patient is responsible for paying the price difference between his chosen 
drugs and a reference drug defined by the government.  Several governments (in South Korea, 
Mexico, Spain, and the UK) regulate the profits of pharmaceutical firms on drugs sold in these 
countries.  The government negotiates with manufacturers and sets a rate of return according to 
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complicated formulas accounting for operating costs, promotion expenditures, and R&D 
spending.   
Countries also differ in subtle non-regulatory aspects.  The number and size of 
pharmacies are highly varied across countries, as are distribution and dispensing margins.  
Physicians have diverse prescribing habits; in Japan, physicians both prescribe and dispense 
drugs, and they tend to prescribe lower doses than elsewhere in the world and combinations of 
drug therapies.  Consumer compliance and trust of doctors is multifarious.  Over-the-counter 
drugs and herbal and “alternative” therapies are more widely used in Europe than in the US, 
though their popularity in the US is increasing.  To the extent that these market characteristics 
(which are not controlled for in the empirical analysis) are systematically related to the use of 
price controls, the interpretation of the effect of price controls should be made with caution. 
III. Launch decisions and pharmaceutical regulation 
Many prior studies on the pharmaceutical industry identify factors that should be 
important in the decision to launch a new drug.  Competition in pharmaceuticals exists both 
within a chemical (branded versus generic, prescription versus over-the-counter) and between 
different chemicals that treat the same condition.  The generic segment garners significant market 
share within a few years of patent expiration when entry occurs, but not all therapeutic classes 
(and very few countries) attract such entry.5  While many have shown that generic competition 
has indisputable significance (at least in the US), there is substantial justification for focusing on 
competition between drugs.  Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) estimate the loss in sales from 
entry by new drugs for the same therapeutic classification and find that entry by such drugs 
reduces the PDV of a drug by considerably more than generics.  These results are broadly 
consistent with other studies that emphasize the importance of intermolecular competition, such 
as Stern (1996) and Berndt et al. (1997). 
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In addition to competition, the regulatory environment has a significant bearing on 
prevailing prices (Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b)).  Countries with stringent regulation of entry 
combined with relatively little price regulation, such as the US and the UK, have highly 
concentrated domestic industries whose products are launched in more foreign markets (Thomas 
(1994)).  One study that addresses international entry (Parker (1984)) shows regulation is related 
to large differences across countries in the number and mix of products introduced before 1978.  
More recent work by Danzon et al. (2003) finds that between 1994 and 1998, drugs introduced in 
the UK and US markets were launched more slowly into countries with low prices, which often 
have price regulation.  Thus, there is much reason to expect regulation to influence entry. 
An important consequence of price controls that relate the domestic price to the prices in 
foreign markets is that pharmaceutical firms now have incentive to launch their products first in 
countries where they have the freedom to set a higher price, since this will influence the price in 
markets with price controls.  Price controls may have an additional effect in Europe through 
parallel imports, permitted between the 15 EU member states since 1995, which enable 
wholesalers to arbitrage price differences between EU countries.  Launching a drug in a country 
with stringent price controls may depress global revenues if wholesalers in countries with higher 
prices purchase drugs in price-controlled markets (with lower prices) for domestic resale.  
Essentially, parallel trade restricts the ability of firms to price discriminate across countries.  One 
possible outcome is that firms serve only the higher price markets: we would observe fewer 
launches in low price markets as a result of parallel trade. 
Regulation also affects drugs and firms differentially within a country, particularly in the 
costs of gaining regulatory approval (Dranove and Meltzer (1994), Carpenter (2002)).  Product 
characteristics, like therapeutic novelty or indication, and firm characteristics, such as experience 
with the FDA and domestic status, are related to the speed at which a new drug receives 
regulatory approval in the US.  Data from three other large pharmaceutical markets (the UK, 
France, and Germany) displays a similar pattern in time-to-market of important drugs, and reveals 
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a strong home country advantage: the drugs of domestic firms are approved earlier than those of 
foreign firms.  Beyond the non-uniform effects of regulation, Scott Morton (1999) finds evidence 
of important firm-specific differences in the entry decisions of generic drug firms.  Firm-specific 
costs are therefore likely to be important in drug launches. 
 This paper examines another possible source of firm differences.  The share of total 
pharmaceutical R&D done in the European Union declined from 49% to 37% between 1990 and 
2000, and European firms increasingly performed their R&D in the US.6  An oft-cited reason for 
these changes is the use of price controls in most European countries.7  It is not obvious why the 
regulatory environment in a firm’s home country would matter since if drug markets are global, 
all firms face the same incentives regardless of location.  However, regulations could affect the 
strategies of domestic firms (differently from foreign firms) in two ways.   
The first mechanism relates to the cost of winning regulatory approval.  The domestic 
market is generally the easiest market to enter (see Kyle (2005), Danzon et al. (2004), Dranove 
and Meltzer (1994)).  For firms whose domestic markets use price controls, this means the price 
in their initial launch market is probably rather low, and the launch price in subsequent markets 
will also be low because of parallel trade and international reference pricing.  These firms also 
face higher entry costs into foreign markets, so it is less likely that they would expect variable 
profits to cover the fixed costs of launch in these additional countries.  Firms headquartered in 
free-pricing countries that introduce a drug in a price-controlled country are also less likely to 
launch in additional markets after that, but their initial launch is more likely to be in a country 
with relatively high prices.  This implies that firms headquartered in a price-controlled market 
will tend to introduce their products in fewer foreign markets.   
The second mechanism relates to the possibility that price controls are not applied to all 
firms in the same way.  Governments could use price controls to favor domestic producers, 
perhaps by ignoring therapeutic value in setting price or simply by compensating domestic firms 
more than foreign firms, so that domestic firms in price controlled countries find it more 
 7
profitable to produce drugs only for their home markets than to develop drugs for use in many 
countries, and foreign firms do not find it as attractive to follow this strategy.  The outcome of 
this industrial policy is low quality drugs (or of little therapeutic innovation) from domestic firms.  
Firms located in countries without this industrial policy have incentives to produce high quality 
drugs (assuming that the market rewards quality with a high price), and these high quality drugs 
are more likely to succeed in other markets.  This mechanism would also generate the prediction 
of different launch patterns for firms depending on their headquarters location. 
IV. Model 
The approach taken in this paper assumes that potential entrants for a market take 
existing market structure as given and compete simultaneously in time t.  Let i index drugs, j 
index firms, k index therapeutic classes, and l index countries.  A market is thus a class-country-
year triple.  Define the reduced-form profit function as 
ijkltiktjkltkltkltkltijklt εαWγZβXθMδNΠ +++++=  
where N is the number of competing drugs in the market, M is the number of potential entrants, X 
is a vector of market characteristics, Z is a vector of firm characteristics, and W is a vector of 
drug characteristics.8  Firms enter if their expected profits are at least zero, and any firm that 
elects not to enter must expect negative profits from entry.  Included in W are the characteristics 
of markets the drug has already been launched in, since entry into a price-controlled market may 
affect subsequent launch strategies.   
This paper takes two estimation approaches to examine the effect of price regulation on 
the launch decision.  One is to estimate whether the number of countries a drug is launched in 
depends on whether it originates in a price-controlled country.  A second approach is to estimate 
whether price controls delay a drug’s launch in a country using a hazard model.  These are 
described in greater detail below. 
A. Negative binomial model 
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The number of countries in which a drug is launched may be estimated as a Poisson or 
negative binomial process such that 
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where c is the count of markets launched in drawn from a negative binomial distribution with 
parameter µ, and 
  iiktjkltkltklti ε  αWγZθMδNlogµ ++++=
with ε reflecting cross-sectional heterogeneity or specification error.  This estimation approach is 
useful for examining the total number of markets reached during a drug’s lifetime as a function of 
its characteristics and its origins (for example, whether its inventor is located in a market with 
price controls). 
 By simply estimating the count of countries entered, each country is essentially assigned 
equal weight.  Since countries vary considerably in size, treating each country equally implies a 
greater weight per capita given to residents of small countries.  The US market is approximately 
twice the size of the largest five European markets combined, but with the negative binomial 
estimation approach, a drug launched in those five countries is measured as having reached 
further.  An alternative measure of market reach is the total population with access to a new drug.  
Therefore, the following equation is estimated using ordinary least squares: 
 
iiktjkltkltklt ε  αWγZθMδN)population log(total ++++=
B. Discrete-time hazard 
The probability that a drug is launched during a time interval t can be written as 
 αWγZβXθMδNa(t)P(t) iktjkltkltkltklt +++++=
where a(t) is a series of intercepts for each year of a drug’s age (or time at risk).  A convenient 
transformation for estimation is the logit, i.e. 
 
αWγZβXθMδNa(t)
P(t)-1
P(t)log iktjkltkltkltklt +++++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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 This method three convenient features.  It accounts for right-censored observations, it 
does not require a functional form assumption about time-dependence, and it permits the use of 
time-varying covariates.  While the negative binomial estimation described above speaks to the 
extent of a drug’s international launch, the discrete time hazard captures both the speed of launch 
and the effect of the characteristics of potential markets on the launch decision. 
Since drug launches are observed at annual intervals in this dataset, a discrete-time model 
is probably more appropriate than a continuous time model such as the Cox Partial Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator, or proportional hazards model.  As the interval of observation becomes 
small, the results from a discrete-time logit converge to those from a proportional hazard model. 9  
While only the estimates from the discrete time model are reported in this paper, results from 
continuous time models are quite similar. 
However, this approach (as well as the use of continuous time hazard models) requires 
several strong assumptions.  Most importantly, the number of potential entrants is treated as an 
exogenous variable, and there is assumed to be no strategic interaction among firms such as 
predatory pricing, collusion, or preemptive entry.  The latter assumption is difficult to justify, but 
made to simplify the empirical analysis.  As recent papers by Acemoglu and Linn (2003) and 
Finkelstein (2003) have shown, the number of drugs developed to treat a condition is almost 
certainly a function of the global profits associated with that disease.  However, this paper 
examines the entry decision into a market conditional on most development costs being sunk, 
rather than the decision to initiate the development of a drug.  Since the average time to bring a 
drug to market is on the order of 7-8 years, the number of potential entrants is effectively fixed 
when the firm decides whether to launch a drug in an additional country.   
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V. Data 
Information on all drugs developed between 1980 and 2000 is obtained from the 
Pharmaprojects database, which is maintained by the UK consulting firm PJB Publications.  This 
dataset includes the drug’s chemical and brand names, the name and nationality of the firm that 
developed it, the identity of licensees, the country and year in which it was patented, its status (in 
clinical trials, registered, or launched) in the 28 largest pharmaceutical markets, and the year of 
launch where applicable.  Each drug is assigned to up to six therapeutic classes.  The system of 
classification used by Pharmaprojects is adapted from the European Pharmaceutical Market 
Research Association; there are 17 broad disease areas (for example, dermatological conditions) 
and 199 more specific classes (such as antipsoriasis treatments).  The sample of drugs used in this 
research is restricted to those that are new chemical or molecular entities by dropping new 
formulations of existing products, OTC licensing opportunities, antidotes, and diagnostic agents 
for a total of 147 classes used in the analysis.   
The OECD Health Data 2000 dataset provides population, GDP, data on access to health 
care, and other demographic information for OECD countries.  Of the 28 countries in 
Pharmaprojects, 21 are also OECD members.  The regulatory structure of each country is 
classified as “price control regime” using the summary tables from Jacobzone’s “Pharmaceutical 
Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social and Industrial Goals.”  Additional detail for 
major European markets was collected from “The Guide to European Pharmaceutical Pricing and 
Reimbursement Systems.”  Table 2 presents information on the various regulations in use across 
countries.   
A market is defined as a country-therapeutic class-year triple.  This definition assumes 
that drugs with the same therapeutic classification are substitutes, and that there is no substitution 
between therapeutic classes.  Of course, the latter assumption is a strong one.  Different classes of 
products may be appropriate for the same condition.  A patient with migraine headaches might be 
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prescribed a treatment specifically for migraines, an NSAID, or a narcotic; these represent three 
distinct classes.  Other therapeutic classes may be complements – drugs that have nausea as a side 
effect are often prescribed in conjunction with an anti-nausea treatment, for instance.  In addition, 
this market definition requires that there be no trade in unapproved products across international 
borders: launching a drug in the US must not enable access to the Canadian market.  While the 
move to a common market in Europe weakens the assumption of separate markets, negotiation 
with health ministries is still necessary for the drug to be reimbursed.  This is an important point: 
it means competition from drugs approved in nearby countries but without local insurance 
coverage is probably weak.  Entry, or launch, is defined as the date a firm has completed all 
negotiations with government agencies.  This includes not only receiving approval, but also 
setting ex-manufacturer or reimbursement prices in countries that regulate them.  A drug is “at 
risk” for entry into all markets beginning in the year of its first launch into any country.  After 
launch in a market, it drops out of the risk set for that country.  Any drug that has been approved 
somewhere in the world for a particular therapeutic class is a potential entrant into that 
therapeutic class in all other countries.   
Drug quality, or the therapeutic advance a treatment represents, is likely an important 
factor in both the fixed costs of entry (if regulators accelerate approval of breakthrough therapies, 
or if regulatory approval is more difficult to obtain for a novel type of therapy with which 
regulators are unfamiliar) and in variable profits.  Unfortunately, objective measures of quality 
are difficult to obtain.  Previous studies have used the ratings of therapeutic novelty assigned by 
the FDA upon application for approval, but these are unavailable for drugs that did not seek entry 
into the US.  Pharmaprojects also ranks drugs according to their novelty, but this ranking is 
retrospective, so a drug that represented a therapeutic advance at its initial launch ten years ago 
may be rated an established therapy in the current database.  The “Essential Drug List” of the 
World Health Organization is another possibility, but it is updated infrequently and most of the 
drugs on the list are more than twenty years old.  Therefore, this research follows Dranove and 
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Meltzer (1994) in using mentions of a drug in medical journals indexed by Medline.  The 
assumption is that important drugs are mentioned in journals because they are the “gold standard” 
of clinical care, or promising in many clinical studies.10  The measure used in this work is a 
drug’s share of total mentions of all drugs in its therapeutic class.  Other aspects of drug quality 
are the number and severity of adverse interactions and side effects, dosage form, and dosage 
frequency.  Systematic data on these characteristics is unavailable, particularly for drugs not 
marketed in the US.   
Quantifying the regulatory barrier to entry, as well as the severity of price regulation, is 
nearly impossible.  One indication is the time between application and approval of a drug.  
However, not only is this unavailable in all markets, but is also likely to be a function of drug 
quality, firm characteristics, the number of other drugs under review, and perhaps the decisions of 
regulators in other countries, and is therefore an imperfect measure.  The variety of regulations in 
these nations is difficult to categorize neatly, and it is also difficult to separately identify the 
effects of each regulatory mechanism.  The existence of price regulation in a country is captured 
by a set of dummy variables, which obscures differences in the implementation of such policies, 
as described in Section II.  All regulatory variables are vulnerable to endogeneity problems, as 
such policies may be reactions to (the perception of) high profits earned by pharmaceutical 
companies.  Only four countries (Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Sweden) enacted price 
controls during the sample period.  Other omitted variables include the importance of generic 
competition within a country (or therapeutic class), the degree to which marketing of 
pharmaceuticals is regulated, the cost of marketing in each country, heterogeneity in prescribing 
behavior, and other subtle but important distinctions between countries.   
Table 3 presents summary statistics for data used in estimation.  The sample used in 
estimation contains 1444 unique molecules produced by 278 firms in 134 therapeutic 
classifications, for a total of 51,525 country-class-year markets.  There were 299,567 entry 
opportunities, only 7,630 of which had a product launch.  The mean number of drugs competing 
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in markets with entry opportunities is 2.6.  The distribution of the number of competitors over all 
markets is shown in Figure 1, both for the entire time period and as of 2000.  Most markets are 
highly concentrated, and over one-fourth have no entry at all.  The large fraction of “0” markets 
reflects both that some drugs are never launched in a country and that some drugs are only 
introduced years after they first become available elsewhere.  However, even as of 2000, 15% of 
markets are empty. 
Country-level demographics provide rough measures of market size and demand.  
Ideally, incidence rates at the level of country-class would be included, but these are difficult to 
obtain and may also be endogenous if pharmaceuticals reduce the occurrence of disease.  In 
general, additional country-level variables such as the number of doctors per capita, 
pharmaceutical spending, and life expectancy proved insignificant11 and so only a parsimonious 
set of variables is presented here.  To control for other country-specific factors that may be 
correlated with the use of price controls and that might also affect entry decisions, the 1995 
Transparency International Corruption Index12 and two measures from Djankov et al. are 
included: an index of market competition and an estimate of the cost of registering a new business 
as a percent of GDP per capita.  Including these country-specific (rather than country-industry 
specific) measures enables isolating the effect of pharmaceutical price controls from general 
bureaucratic problems associated with a country.  In addition, a measure of each country’s 
relative price ranking is included (as published in “The Guide to European Pharmaceutical 
Pricing and Reimbursement Systems” using data from regulators in France and Germany), 
although price comparisons across countries are difficult due to different sets of products 
available and exchange rate fluctuations.  The inclusion of this variable is an attempt to control 
for the stringency of price controls (how much they bind) and to test whether delayed entry into a 
market is due entirely to low prices, or partly caused by delays in negotiating price. 
Variables measured at the drug-year level include age, the number of countries in which 
the drug has been introduced, and its share of the stock of Medline citations for its therapeutic 
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class.  There may be economies of scale in global production, as clinical trial data is accumulated 
and used in subsequent applications, or if regulators are exposed to less political risk in approving 
a drug that has already been accepted by their counterparts in other countries.  The probability of 
entry is thus expected to be concave in the number of launch countries.  A drug’s value should 
decline with age, due to the limited period of patent protection and competition from newer 
therapies, so entry is predicted to be convex in age.  Drugs that are the subject of many scientific 
studies should be more profitable, so a positive coefficient on the measure of drug importance is 
expected. 
Several firm-level variables are included.  International experience is the count of the 
number of countries in which the firm markets any drug.  A firm’s experience in a country is 
defined as the count of drugs it markets in that country.  These capture economies of scale and 
scope: experience with the regulator and the presence of a detailing force may be spread across all 
a firm’s products within a country, and there may be economies of scale in global distribution.  
Care should be taken in interpreting the coefficients on these variables, though, since they may 
only be picking up duration dependence, or the effect of an unobserved factor for all a firm’s 
launches in a market over time. 
VI. Results 
A. Extent of international launch 
Table 4 provides estimation results from the negative binomial models13 and OLS models 
of the number of countries launched in and the log of total population reached, respectively, eight 
years after a drug’s initial launch.  Similar results obtain after four and twelve years, but eight is 
roughly the number of years of market exclusivity for most drugs.  All specifications include year 
and therapeutic class fixed effects.  There are no noteworthy differences in the results from the 
negative binomial and linear specifications. 
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In general, the coefficients are consistent with expectations.  Important drugs enter more 
countries, and pharmaceuticals invented by firms that are active in many countries are likely to 
reach more markets.  However, firms with many drugs in their portfolios tend to launch their 
drugs in fewer countries.  This suggests some effort on the part of multiproduct firms to match a 
market to the most appropriate treatments, or perhaps a portfolio of “me-too” products – those 
that are chemically similar to existing drugs and that offer little therapeutic advance – that are 
unlikely to succeed in many markets. 
The results suggest that drugs invented by firms in countries with price controls tend to 
be less successful on the global market.  In Models 1 and 3, the coefficient on the dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm’s domestic market regulates price is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, implying that drugs invented by firms in price-controlled countries reach 2 fewer 
markets on average.  One interpretation of this pattern is that the incentives created by price 
control regimes spur firms in these countries to introduce new products that are slightly different 
from, but not a huge advance over, their existing products, because the prices of their existing 
products are ratcheted down by regulators over time.  Thomas (2001) believes this is particularly 
true for Japanese firms, and more recently, Duggan and Scott Morton (2004) find evidence that 
Medicaid reimbursement laws have prompted a similar strategy in the US.  However, all 
pharmaceutical firms should face these incentives unless entry regulation or price controls have 
different effects on firms from different countries.  That is, a British firm should be able to reap 
the same rewards from introducing a “me-too” product on the Italian market as an Italian firm, 
unless the British firm faces higher entry costs or expects a lower price (and lower profits) than 
the Italian firm in Italy.  In addition, the measure of quality used should control for “me-too” 
drugs that generate few medical citations (although there are many shortcomings associated with 
this control).  An alternative interpretation is that countries with price controls happen to have 
populations with idiosyncratic needs, and domestic firms are better suited to developing drugs for 
those needs.  Absent a reason why only countries with price controls would have such 
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idiosyncratic needs, however, this interpretation seems incomplete.  Thus, there is some evidence 
that price controls or entry regulations may be used by governments as a tool of industrial policy 
to favor domestic firms. 
 The other explanation offered in Section III was that if domestic firms face lower entry 
costs into their own markets, the initial market of firms headquartered in price-controlled 
countries is likely to be a relatively low price one.  Due to international reference pricing and 
parallel trade, an early launch in a low price country can make subsequent launches less 
attractive.  Models 2 and 4 include dummy variables indicating whether a drug was first launched 
in a domestic or foreign market, and whether the first market was price-controlled.  (The results 
are similar if “low price” and “high price” markets are defined instead of price-controlled or free-
pricing.)  Relative to the omitted category, which includes drugs launched first in domestic 
markets without price controls, products whose first country of introduction is price-controlled 
(either domestic or foreign) are launched in 1.7-1.9 fewer markets after 8 years.  The results from 
these specifications are consistent with the explanation that if the first launch is in a price-
controlled country, and most first launches are in the domestic market, then the country of 
headquarters can affect the launch patterns of new drugs.  These results also suggest that price 
controls affect entry decisions not only in the country that impose them, but also other potential 
markets. 
B. Launch order and timing strategies 
Results from the discrete time hazard models are presented in Table 5, along with the 
marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables.  All models include year and 
therapeutic class fixed effects, though the individual coefficients are not reported.  Country fixed 
effects are not included since the variables of greatest interest, those measuring the use of price 
controls, have little intracountry variation.  Model 1 is the most parsimonious specification; 
Model 2 includes more detailed measures of cost-containment regulations for the subset of 
countries for which such data exist; and Model 3 adds interactions between the price rank of a 
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potential launch market with a dummy variable for the post-1995 period (when parallel trade 
within the EU became significantly easier).  
Results for most variables are fairly stable across all specifications, and the marginal 
effects are often quantitatively important given that the mean probability of entry is only 3%.  As 
would be expected, countries with large populations are likely to be launched in quickly, although 
the coefficient on GDP per capita is negative and statistically insignificant in Models 2 and 3.  
The existence of competing drugs in a market is associated with increased rates of entry as well, 
which is likely due to the correlation of previous entry with unobserved demand in that country.14  
Domestic firms tend to enter the market with short delays (entry into a domestic market is four 
times greater than into a foreign market), as do firms with extensive international experience or 
that have greater experience in the market.  The speed of launch increases with a drug’s 
importance and the number of other markets it has entered, but falls with age, as the patent nears 
expiration and more innovative products may have been developed (coefficients are not reported 
to conserve space, but are available from the author).  Consistent with the results from the models 
for extent of launch, drugs invented by firms headquartered in price-controlled countries are less 
likely to be introduced in additional markets.  Entry is less likely in markets with high entry costs 
for other industries.  The coefficients on the measures of corruption and market competition 
indicate that countries with less market competition and higher perceptions of corruption are 
actually more attractive for entry.   
The effect of price controls is quite substantial, even after controlling for the average 
level of prices in a country and other country-level factors.  The coefficients on the main effect of 
the price control or supply-side control dummies range from -.324 to -.452, depending on the 
specification, and these estimates are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  At the mean of 
all other variables, this implies about a 75% reduction in the probability of entry relative to a 
country without price controls.  Interestingly, the use of demand-side controls does not appear to 
have a negative effect on launch.  It may be that some of these controls are not enforced 
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particularly well (for example, in most countries the penalty for exceeding the prescribing budget 
amounts to a stern letter to the errant doctor).  Entry actually appears more likely in countries 
using therapeutic class reference pricing.  There is some evidence, therefore, that demand-side 
controls may be preferable to explicit price controls from the standpoint of attracting new drugs.  
 The coefficient on the price rank of a country is negative and significant in Models 2 and 
3, which is somewhat surprising.  It implies that high price markets are less attractive for launch.  
However, it is certainly possible that there are entry barriers which are not captured by any of the 
country-level control variables and which are higher for high price markets.  Importantly, a drug 
that has been previously launched in a high price market is much more likely to enter an 
additional market than those previously launched in low price markets.  (The excluded category 
includes countries for which no price ranking exists, which tend to be Asian or South American 
countries.)  When an interaction term with the post-1995 period is included (Model 3), it appears 
that launch in higher price countries is more likely when parallel trade is more widespread.  Since 
parallel traders can essentially arbitrage price differences across countries in the EU, entry into 
high price countries should be more attractive, and entry into low price markets less so, as 
imports of drugs from low price countries could crowd out sales in higher price markets. 
 These patterns are consistent with firms’ preference for entry into markets with free 
pricing first, reaping profits from high prices for as long as possible, and launching their products 
in low price markets as late as possible given the constraints of a limited period of patent 
protection and the threat of entry by competitors in these markets.  It suggests that the effect of 
price controls is not isolated to an individual market, but rather affects the launch of a drug in 
other markets as well. 
VII. Conclusion 
While firm and product characteristics have substantial effects on the entry pattern of a 
new drug, this research demonstrates that the impact of price regulations used in many developed 
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countries also has a large bearing on launch patterns.  Price controls delay or reduce the 
probability of launch in countries that impose them, and these effects carry over into other 
markets as well.  Price controls appear to have differential impacts on foreign and domestic firms, 
and negatively affect the extent of international launch for products invented by domestic firms. 
There are two implications for public policy from this research.  The costs of deterring 
innovative products that may result from imposing price controls should be balanced against any 
short-run savings from lower prices, in addition to concerns about the long-run effects on R&D 
incentives and the development of future products.  Second, the effect of price controls is not 
isolated to a single market, but influences the global launch decisions of pharmaceutical firms and 
thus impacts the extent and timing of a new drug’s launch.  These results have particular salience 
as individual states in the US adopt price control measures to control Medicaid costs, and as the 
federal government considers similar legislation.  The strategic response to changes in links 
between markets, such as international reference pricing and parallel trade, should also be 
considered for poorer countries expected to enter the EU and for developing countries elsewhere.  
One effect of efforts to keep prices low in such countries could be a reduction in the number of 
innovative products available. 
However, some important caveats warrant mention.  Price controls may be an 
endogenous response to some other factor not captured in the regressions presented here.  They 
may also be correlated with an omitted variable, such as other industrial policies or drug safety 
regulation.  In addition, this research makes no statements about the effect of price controls on 
total social welfare.  It may well be that the increased use of pharmaceuticals that results from 
lower drug prices more than outweighs the costs associated with delays to market or reduction in 
incentives for R&D.  Estimation of welfare would require considerably more detailed information 
on prices and consumption.  Future work should also incorporate better measures of country-
specific demand and costs associated with product launch.  Lastly, a structural approach that 
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addresses the problem of endogenous entry by competitors and responses by governments and 
that examines the nature of competition in these markets may be appropriate. 
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 Table 1: Origin and launch markets  
Numbers in cells represent introductions of drugs invented by firms headquartered in the “origin” 
country (columns) in the “launch country” (rows).  Origin countries with fewer than 50 total 
launches are excluded from the table.  Note the tendency to launch most drugs in the country of 
origin.
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Argentina 2 3 62 39 27 38 11 2 7 35 27 115
Australia 1 8 41 25 3 34 10 2  43 60 159
Austria 2 10 29 50 12 36 10 5  33 27 106
Belgium 3 13 65 50 14 34 11 4 2 46 55 171
Brazil 2 4 47 31 25 24 9  4 24 22 102
Canada 1 8 44 17 7 31 8 4  42 51 162
Colombia 1 2 28 21 12 19 5  4 22 20 62
Denmark 1 16 40 28 5 35 12 4 2 39 51 154
France 2 10 133 56 18 57 18 4 1 63 57 216
Germany 4 14 97 108 18 70 16 7 2 75 76 259
Greece 2 11 51 22 17 23 10 3 2 31 23 109
Ireland 1 14 36 23 8 28 9 3  34 52 127
Italy 3 8 92 67 96 66 14 5 3 53 75 185
Japan 5 6 46 52 9 298 14 2 3 44 34 151
Mexico 2 2 38 29 15 38 9 1 7 26 28 99
Netherlands 2 11 45 33 8 31 13 3 3 29 45 133
Peru 1  30 18 5 20 5 1 6 18 15 49
Philippines 2 3 35 28 13 38 6 1 1 25 29 94
Portugal 2 6 58 37 26 34 8 3 7 29 37 113
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Turkey 1 1 19 5 9 9 9 1  20 18 29
UK 3 16 73 45 10 45 15 3 1 62 97 237
USA 2 9 56 38 7 55 15 4  51 70 307
Venezuela 2 1 19 11 11 16 6  3 12 15 50
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 Table 2: Regulatory structure of countries 
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Black = regulation is used, white = regulation is not used, gray = no information. Sources: Urch Publishing, “The Guide to European Pharmaceutical Pricing and 
Reimbursement Systems” and Jacobzone, ““Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social and Industrial Goals.”  Information is not available 
for all countries from either source. 
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 Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Number of drugs 1444 
Number of firms 278 
Number of therapeutic classes 134 
Years covered 1980-1999 
Number of markets (country-class-year 
observations) 
51525 
Number of entry opportunities (drug-country-
class-year observations) 
299567 
Number of entry events 7630 
Level of 
observation 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Firm-country-
year 
Country experience Count of firm's other drugs launched in 
country 
73827 3.226 6.149 0 39 
Number of drugs in market Count of drugs in therapeutic class-count
market 
48833 2.624 3.358 0 30 Country-class-
year 
Number of potential 
competitors 
Count of drugs launched in class elsewhe
in the world 
48833 9.321 8.712 1 79 
Drug age Number of years since drug's first 
launch anywhere 
18733 8.257 5.129 0 15 
Number of countries 
launched in 
 
 
18733 6.049 6.646 0 27 
Drug importance Drug's share of stock of Medline citation
for therapeutic class 
18733 0.010 0.066 0 1 
Prior launch in a high price 
country 
Dummy = 1 if drug has been launched in
country with price rank > 7 
18733 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Drug-year 
Prior launch in a low price 
country 
Dummy = 1 if drug has been launched in
country with price rank < 7 
18733 0.533 0.499 0 1 
Firm-country Home country Dummy = 1 if firm is headquartered in 
country 
5801 0.044 0.205 0 1 
International experience Count of countries in which firm has 
launched any drugs 
3813 9.243 9.284 0 28 Firm-year 
Portfolio Total number of firm's drugs 
 
3813 4.949 8.762 1 80 
Firm Firm is headquartered in a 
price-controlled country 
 278 0.493 0.501 0 1 
Population Population in 10s of millions 
 
420 4.538 5.527 0.34 27.29 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in US$1000s, PPP 
 
420 14.265 6.279 2.25 31.94 
Country-year 
Price freeze Dummy = 1 if country has a price 
freeze in effect 
420 0.181 0.385 0 1 
Corruption Index TI’s “Perceived Corruption Index” 
(higher score = less corruption) 
420 6.790 2.094 2.99 9.32 
Market competition index 420 5.252 0.377 4.4 5.9 
Country 
(see Table 2 for 
regulation 
measures) Entry costs as percent of 
GDP per capita 
Measures from Djankov et al. 
420 0.166 0.152 0 0.59 
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 Table 4: Extent of launch 
Negative Binomial 
Y=(N countries entered) 
Linear 
Y=ln(population reached)
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable 
Coef. 
(Std Err) dY/dX 
Coef. 
(Std Err) dY/dX 
Model 3 
Coef. 
(Std Err) 
Model 4 
Coef. 
(Std Err) 
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 Number of potential entrants 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.006) 
0.013 
(0.008) (0.008) 
0.032** 0.037** 0.030** 0.033** International experience 
(0.004) 0.256 (0.004) 0.278 (0.005) (0.005) 
-0.005** -0.005** -0.004 -0.004 Portfolio 
(0.002) -0.040 (0.002) -0.038 (0.002) (0.002) 
0.655** 0.730** 0.667** 0.713** Drug importance 
(0.154) 3.262 (0.156) 3.613 (0.252) (0.250) 
-0.349**   -0.208**  Firm is headquartered in a 
price-controlled country (0.062) -2.049   (0.075)  
  -0.336**  -0.260* First launch market is 
domestic and price-controlled   (0.080) -1.706  (0.101) 
  -0.398**  -0.458** First launch market is foreign 
and price-controlled   (0.083) -1.887  (0.107) 
  -0.022  -0.088 First launch market is foreign 
and free-pricing   (0.075) 0.182  (0.100) 
Observations 979 979 979 979 
Log Likelihood or Adj. R2 -2694.6 -2686.77 0.2021 0.2189 
 
*= 5% significance, ** = 1 %.  Marginal effects are computed at the mean of all independent variables; marginal 
effects for dummy variables represent the change from 0 to 1.  All specifications include year and therapeutic class 
fixed effects. 
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  Table 5: Discrete time hazard of launch 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef. 
(Std Err) dY/dX 
Coef. 
(Std Err) dY/dX 
Coef. 
(Std Err) dY/dX 
0.031** 0.028** 0.028** Number of drugs in market 
 (0.005) 
0.0008 
 (0.007) 
0.0008 
 (0.007) 
0.0007
-0.053** 0.005  0.005  Number of potential 
entrants  (0.003) 
-0.0013 
 (0.004) 
0.0001 
 (0.004) 
0.0001
-0.002  0.062** 0.073** Population 
 (0.003) 
-0.0001 
 (0.018) 
0.0016 
 (0.018) 
0.0017
0.046** -0.002  -0.021  GDP per capita 
 (0.005) 
0.0013 
 (0.013) 
-0.0001 
 (0.014) 
-0.0005
-0.092** -0.219** -0.230** Corruption score 
 (0.011) 
-0.0023 
 (0.022) 
-0.0058 
 (0.022) 
-0.0056
-0.819** -1.170** -1.110** Market competition 
 (0.031) 
-0.0207 
 (0.078) 
-0.0311 
 (0.080) 
-0.0271
-1.780** -3.470** -3.660** Entry cost as percent of 
GDP per capita  (0.121) 
-0.0450 
 (0.232) 
-0.0921 
 (0.237) 
-0.0893
0.054** 0.023** 0.023** Experience in country 
 (0.003) 
0.0013 
 (0.005) 
0.0005 
 (0.005) 
0.0005
1.666** 1.480** 1.474** Domestic firm 
 (0.050) 
0.1200 
 (0.075) 
0.1119 
 (0.075) 
0.1017
0.009** 0.018** 0.018** International experience 
 (0.002) 
0.0003 
 (0.003) 
0.0005 
 (0.003) 
0.0005
-0.017** -.012** -0.012** Portfolio 
 (0.001) 
-0.0005 
 (0.002) 
-0.0003 
 (0.002) 
-0.0002
0.836** 0.962** 0.974** Drug importance 
 (0.178) 
0.0212 
 (0.244) 
0.0255 
 (0.243) 
0.0237
0.163** 0.158** 0.158** Number of countries 
launched in  (0.003) 
0.0040 
 (0.005) 
0.0042 
 (0.005) 
0.0039
-0.201** 0.224** 0.092  Price freeze 
 (0.037) 
-0.0144 
 (0.072) 
0.0166 
 (0.079) 
0.0062
-0.324**     Price controls 
 (0.028) 
-0.0230 
    
-0.208** -0.126** -0.126** Firm headquartered in a 
price-controlled country  (0.031) 
-0.0151 
 (0.043) 
-0.0098 
 (0.043) 
-0.0090
  -0.418** -0.452** Supply-side controls 
   (0.093) 
-0.0318 
 (0.095) 
-0.0311
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   0.084  -0.031  Prescribing budgets 
   (0.092) 
0.0060 
 (0.097) 
-0.0021
  0.854** 0.871** Therapeutic class reference 
pricing    (0.059) 
0.0643 
 (0.059) 
0.0602
  -0.966** -1.020** Pharmacoeconomic 
evidence    (0.066) 
-0.0733 
 (0.068) 
-0.0706
  0.826** 0.825** Prior launch in a high price 
country    (0.049) 
0.0628 
 (0.049) 
0.0567
  0.188** 0.188** Prior launch in a low price 
country    (0.047) 
0.0144 
 (0.047) 
0.0131
  -0.068** -0.069** Price rank 
   (0.010) 
-0.0019 
 (0.010) 
-0.0017
    0.054** Price rank*post-1995 
period      (0.013) 
0.0035
Observations 299567 148531 148531 
Log likelihood -28208.1965 -14728.1660 -14720.1088 
*= 5% significance, ** = 1 %.  Marginal effects are computed at the mean of all independent variables for a 4 year 
old drug in 1997 in the antiarrythmics class; marginal effects for dummy variables represent the change from 0 to 1.  
All specifications include year and therapeutic class fixed effects.   
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 Figure 1: Distribution of the Number of Drugs in a Market 
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1 Figures are annual totals for 2000.  Source: IMS Health. 
2 Thomas et al. (1998), p. 790. 
3 “Drug companies hit out at French price controls,” Financial Times, June 10, 2001. 
4 See Jacobzone (2000) for a detailed summary of regulations in each country. 
5 Generic competition in the US is the focus of Caves et al. (1991) and Grabowski and Vernon 
(1992), among others.  Hudson (2000) looks at the determinants of generic entry in the US, the 
UK, Germany, and Japan.  Ellison et al. (1997) and Berndt et al. (1997) consider competition 
both within and between drugs.   
6 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, “Barriers to Innovation in 
the Development of New Medicines in Europe and Possible Solutions to Address these Barriers” 
7 Financial Times, May 8, 2002, p. 21. 
8 Product quality is considered exogenous.  Once a drug has been developed and tested, its 
efficacy is fixed: a firm cannot re-position a low-quality drug as a high-quality product.  In 
reality, some “tweaking” is possible, such as once-a-day dosing formulations, but such changes 
are second order.  
9 See Amemiya (1985), pp. 433-455, or Allison (1984) for a more complete discussion of 
duration models. 
10 An obvious concern is that dangerous drugs may also have a high number of mentions.  
However, while a dangerous drug may have an increase in citations in 1-2 years before or after its 
withdrawal, its overall stock of citations in its therapeutic class does not seem to increase by 
much.  The correlation between worldwide citations and a dummy variable indicating that a drug 
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is eventually pulled from the market is -.038, and the correlation between the “importance” 
measure and this dummy variable is -.042. 
11 What these variables measure is unclear.  A long life expectancy may indicate good health, but 
does this reflect low demand (healthy people don’t need drugs, so little entry) or availability 
treatments (lots of entry)? 
12 This index can be downloaded from http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html. 
 
13Negative binomial models were estimated because the data exhibited overdispersion, violating 
the assumption of equality of the mean and variance required for the Poisson. 
14 If these models are estimated using country-therapeutic class interaction fixed effects, the effect 
of competition on additional entry is negative.  However, this specification does not permit 
consideration of regulatory effects. 
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